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MENTAL CONTENTS IN A WORLD OF CAUSES 
}OSEP E. CORBi 
and J OSEP ·L. PRADES 
In everyday life we explain and predict people's behaviour. by appeal-
ing to their beliefs and desires. Several philosophers, in cognitive sci-
úncÉI=argue that, if such explanations and predictions are at all possi-
ble, it is because we assume a number of generalizations concernipg 
people's mental states and behaviour. Insofar as these generalizations 
are minimally articulated, we can conclude that our ordinary accounts 
of people's behaviour presuppose something like a psychological theo-
ry, that is, a commonsense psychology. A central feature of this com-
mon sense psychology is that it posits mental states that have causal 
powers in virtue of their contents. This trait is certainly included in 
Frege's conception of thinking, since, in his own terms, thinking is 
grasping thoughts (i.e., a certain ldnd of content) and thoughts causal-
ly affect the world by being grasped by the mind. I 
In any event, one of the fundamental issues in cognitive science is 
precisely to determine whether mental contents can be causally effica-
cious and, therefore, preserved in a scientific psychology. In this paper, 
we intend to pursue some aspects of this fundamental issue by examin-
ing Fred Dretske's most recent contributions. Dretske defends the 
causal efficac¥ of mental content qua mental content2, but imposes an . 
important restriction: mental contents can operate as structuring, but 
not as triggering causes. We shall argue, by contrast, that mental con-· 
tents can also intervene as triggering causes. 
j _ 
_L 
]OSEP E. CoRBi and ]OSEP L. PRADES 149 
We shall divide the paper into four sections. Firstly, we shall intra· 
.duce the terms of the discussion, which include two basic principles: 
the strong supervenience constraint and the intrinsicness condition. 
Both principles impose restrictions upon the sorts of properties that 
can be causally efficacious. The intrinsicness condition stresses that 
only the intrinsic properties of a system can· be causally efficacious, 
while the strong supervenience constraint makes a traditional point 
about the causal efficacy of properties. In the second section, we shall 
introduce Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering 
causes, and accept that it actually undercuts the intrinsicness condi-
tion as a necessary requirement for causal efficacy. Since structuring 
causes are typically extrinsic. Yet, Dretske assumes that triggering caus-
es still need to respect the intrinsicness condition. The third section is 
precisely devoted to questioning this assumption. Specifically, we shall 
call into doubt the strong supervenience constraint that the intrinsic-
ness condition presupposes. Thus, we shall conclude that, despite their 
essential extrinsicness, mental contents (qua mental contents) can op· 
erate as triggering causes. We end the paper with a fourth section 
which recapitulates our fundamental claims. 
I THE TERMS OF THE DISCUSSION 
Dretske's main goal, in Explaining Behaviour, is to show how mental 
contents can play a role "in the causal explanation of human behav-
iour. "3 According to Dretske, mental contents are explanatorily rele-
vant insofar as they are causally efficacious. But Dretske, as opposed to 
Donald Davidson, is not interested in the mere causal efficacy of 
events that possess mental content, but in whether an event can be 
causally efficacious in virtue of possessing a certain mental content. 
Only if we succeed in accounting for this last possibility, will we be 
able to recognize the causal efficacy of mental contents qua mental 
contents: 
"We can, following Davidson [Davidson, 1963], say that reasons are 
causes, but the problem is to understand how their being reasons 
contributes to, or helps explain, their effects on motor output. 
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Trying to exhibit the causal efficacy of meaning one is exploring the 
possibility, not of meaning itself being a cause, but a thing's having 
meaning being a cause or of the fact that something has meaning bú=
ing a causally relevant fact about the thing. "4 
To appreciate Dretske's undertaking we need first to state why 
Dretske and other philosophers may fmd it problematic that reasons 
should be relevant to the_ causal explanation of human behaviour. To 
put it in a nutshell, the philosophical issues that Dretske addresses is 
whether the causal efficacy of mental content is compatible with mate· 
rialism. Let us, then, begin by elucidating Dretske's materialist stance, 
as opposed to other materialist positions. 
Dretske confesses to be a materialist, 6 but dedicates little time to de-
scribing what sort of materialism he is committed to. One can obtain, 
though, a more precise picture of the main claims that compose 
Dretske's materialism out of his philosophical practice, that is, by ex-_ 
amining the way he approaches particular philosophical ·problems. 
Specifically, it seems clear that Dretske's account of the explanatory 
relevance of mental content is pertinent only if he assumes a strong su-
pervenience thesis of mental properties upon physical properties. we· 
therefore propose to assume that Dretske is committed to the following 
materialist thesis: All properties in the world are either physical proper-
ties or properties that meet the strong supervenience constraint. Fol-
lowing Jaegwom .Kim7, we can say that the strong supervenience con-
straint& is met by a property when there are certain physical properties 
that constitute a sufficient condition for the instantiation, in all possible 
worlds9, of this particular property. Strong materialism is the sort of ma-
terialism that includes the strong supervenience constraint. Correspon-
dingly, meJ?.tal properties will only be compatible with strong material-
ism insofar as they meet the strong supervenience constraint. Hence, 
meeting the strong supervenience constraint is a necessary condition to 
acknowledge the causal explanatory relevance of mental contents. For 
only real properties can actually be causally efficacious. Objections 
have been raised, however, that there are principled reasons against 
mental contents meeting such a constraint. We shall examine Dretske's 
strategy to rebut a number of such objections, but, before getting into . 
details, a few more principles and distinctions need to be introduced. 
Strong supervenience is opposed to global supervenience. The latter 
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imposing a very general constraint according to which two worlds 
which share all their physical properties must also share all their non-
physical ID properties. We should emphasize that global supervenience 
is stating a constraint that all nonphysical properties need to meet, but 
is not concerned with all the constraints that any particular kind of 
nonphysical property must meet. In other words, it is entirely compati-
ble with global supervenience the fact that certain nonphysical proper-
ties should be not only globally, but strongly, supervenient upon the 
physical properties of the world. Accordingly, we defme· global materi-
alism as the sort of materialism that is committed to the global super-
venience constraint, but not to the strong supervenience constraint. It 
seems obvious that the causal efficacy of mental contents is compati-
ble with global materialism. For only a dualist would doubt that two 
physically identical worlds will also share all their mental properties. 
Consequently, our philosophical issue only arises if we are concerned 
with strong materialism. 
It has also been argued, however, that, apart from the strong super-
venience constraint, a further requirement needs to be met before 
recognizing the causal relevance of nonphysical properties, namely, 
the intrinsicness condition. This condition demands· that only the in-
trinsic (i.e., individualistically individuated) properties of a system can 
· be explanatorily relevant. The intrinsicness condition presupposes the 
strong supervenience constraint, since a property is to be judged intrin-
sic only if it strongly supervenes upon the physical properties of the or-
ganism that possesses them. Correspondingly, we shall speak in this 
case of intrinsic materialism. 
One may find an obvious motivation for the intrinsicness condition 
is the intuition that two intrinsically indistinguishable systems will nec-
essarily produce the same outputs, have the same causal powers, no 
matter how different their relational properties could be 11. Two intrin-
sically indistinguishable cars will perform equally, even if one is ours 
and the other is yours. If we apply the intrinsicness condition to men-
tal contents, then we are bound to conclude that mental contents can 
only be explanatorily relevant if they are intrinsic properties of an or-
ganism; in .other words, if they are in the head. The problem is that 
mental conúÉní=may have trouble meeting the intrinsic supervenience 
constraint, since they appear to be eXtrinsic or relational properties of 
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an organism.12 Thus, Putnam and others13 have shown, for instance, 
that if mental contents are to meet such a constraint they cannot be 
construed in the traditional guise, that is, as Fregean thoughts. For · 
Fregean thoughts are supposed to fix not only the sense but the refer-
ence of our propositional attitudes. l4 But it can be argued that the ref-
erence of an organism's mental state is a relational property of áíú=
whereby its determination partly depends on circumstances that are ex-
ternal to the organism. Consequently, two organisms could share all 
their intrinsic properties and still differ in the reference of their mental 
contents. This is, though, what the intrinsicness condition excludes. 
Since everybody tends to accept the validity of this argument, let us as-
sume that Fregean thoughts are not compatible with intrinsic material-
ism. 
People who are c9mmitted both to intrinsic materialism and the 
causal efficacy of mental content certainly need to provide an alterna-
tive notion of mental content that squares with the intrinsicness condi-
tion. This is the direction the notion of narrow content points to. For 
years, the development of a plausible notion of narrow content has ap-
peared· as the only available strategy to acknowlÉdúÉ=the causal rele-
vance of mental content. The results, though, have not been very 
promising. Some defences of narrow content look rather like desperate 
moves. l5 Dretske, by contrast, shifts to a different perspective. Instead 
of seeking to show the compatibility of the. causal efficacy of mental 
contents with intrinsic materialism, he calls into question the intrinsic- · 
ne ss condition for tlie causal relevance of properties. 
. Accordingly, Dretske' s vindication of the causal relevance of mental 
contents can be divided into two steps: (i) Showing that the intrinsic-
ness condition is not a necessary requirement for the causal relevance 
of properties and, therefore, challenging the idea that mental contents 
need to be in the head in order to be explanatorily relevant; and (ii) de-
veloping an account of how mental contents can meet the strong su-
pervenience constraint, which still holds. 
In the next section, we shall describe the frrst step in Dretske's ap-
proach by introducing his distinction between structuring and trigger-
ing causes. This distinction undermines the intrinsicness condition as 
a necessary requirement for causal efficacy. Since structuring causes 
can certainly be extrinsic. Yet, according to Dretske, triggering causes 
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still need to respect the intrinsicness condition. The third section will 
be devoted to challenging precisely this last conviction. As a result, 
Dretske's naturalization program (the second step) will become meta-
physically superfluous . 
. II STRUCfURING CAUSES NEEDN'T RESPECT 
THE INTRINSICNESS CONDITION 
Dretske is ready to concede the extrinsicness of meaning. In the de-
bate about narrow content, Dretske undoubtedly takes an extemalist 
position. Now the challenge is to prove that extrinsicness does not de-
prive mental content of explanatory relevance. As Dretske indicates, 
the point goes as follows: 
"The point, then, is not that extrinsic properties make no causal dif-
ference (they can), but that, in order to acquire an explanatory rele-
vance they must supervene on, and work through, intrinsic differ-
ences in the system whose behaviour they serve to explain. In order 
to capture this important feature, therefore, I stipulate that by an ex-
trinsic system I mean a system whose behaviour (some of it anyway) 
is causally explained by extrinsic (qua extrinsic) properties that do 
not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the stuff of which the system 
is composed. Two such systems can be intrinsically the same, and in 
this sense physically indistinguishable, and still differ in the extrinsic 
properties that explain their respective behaviours." 16 
The notion of behaviour as an endogenously generated process and 
the distinction between structuring and triggering causes is at the core 
of Dretske's attempt to defend the causal efficacy of extrinsic (qua ex-
trinsic) properties. According to Dretske, "Behaviour-whether of an 
animal, a plant, or a machine-is a process in which some kind of exter-
nal movement [M] or change is produced (caused) by internal events 
[C]."l7 Schematically, behaviour is a process C --7 M, where C is an in-
ternal cause and M a movement. 18 Dretske's notion of process does 
not reduce, however, to a mere regular sequence of events, but is con-
cerned with the bringing about of one event by the other. 19 Behaviour 
is, then, the process by which C is bringing about M. Accordingly, we 
must not confuse behaviour with motor output. For behaviour is the 
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entire process C --7 M, while the output reduces to M.20' In any event, 
·if behaviour is a process, how can behaviour be causally explained? 
Dretske distinguishes between the triggering and structuring causes 
of a process. To adapt an example proposed by Dretske himself21, sup-
pose I press the arrows on my computer keyboard and the cursor 
moves in the appropriate direction. I may ask myself why this is so. 
Two sorts of explanatory demands hide behind this úánglÉ= 'why.' 
Suppose I have been pressing keys at random and do not know the 
pressure of which one caused the cursor to shift to the right. In such a 
case, I am interested in getting to know the particular key that pro-
voked such a shift. I am interested in the triggering cause of the move 
of the cursor to the right. In general, the triggering cause T of a move-
ment M is the event of a certain type that, together with certain back-
ground conditions, causes M.22 We shall refer to explanations that indi-
cate the triggering cause of a process as triggering explanations. 
Suppose now that I already know which key on my computer key-
board shifts the cursor to the right. In other words, I know that there is 
a process which goes from pressing a certain key (C) to a shift of the 
cursor to the right (M). In seeking to explain this process, I may focus 
on the triggering cause of C, that is, on the event of a certain type (for 
instance, my fmgertip movement) which caused C, which in turn 
caused M. But I may want to know why C has got wired to M, i.e., why 
my computer has got structured in such a way that C causes M. In such 
a case, Dretske would say that we were looking for the structuring cause 
of the process C --7 M. 23 The structuring cause accounts not for C be-
ing caused, but for C causing M. The relevance of explanations that ap-
peal to structuring causes is particulariy manifest in cases of malfunc-
tioning. Think when the defmition of the keys on your keyboard have 
been changed in order, for instance, to write in another language with a 
different alphabet. At this juncture, one would certainly be eager to 
know how C got tied to M and how it could be linked to a different out-
put, so that one's own keyboard should recover its reassuring habitual 
behaviour. Finally, it seems obvious that the distinction between trig-
gering and structuring causes not only applies to machine processes, 
but to all sorts of processes, animal and human behaviour included. 
If we acknowledge the legitimacy of structuring explanations (that is, 
causal explanations that are concerned with the structuring causes of 
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processes), we are bound to challenge the intrinsicness condition for 
the explanatory relevance of a property. For structuring causes are con-
cerned with extrinsic properties of the process ·they are meant to ex-
plain. Two intrinsically identical processes may have quite different 
structuring causes. For instance, suppose two computers A and B 
where the pressing of the key labelled 'ii' produces the sign *:* on the 
screen. The structuring cause in computer A may be that somebody 
has substituted the American definition of the keyboard for the 
Spanish one·; whereas in computer B the structuring cause of such a 
process might the presence of a certain virus. 
Objections could be raised that in our example computers A and B 
were not intrinsically indistinguishable, but only the process ii ---7 :. But 
suppose computers A and Bare intrinsically identical and the process 
'ii'-*:* still holds in both. We may still have different structuring caus-
es, that is, distinct responses to the question about why 'ii' got tied to 
*:*. In computer A the structuring cause may be a mistake in the 
process of production, whereas in computer B the structuring cause 
may not be a mistake in the process of production, but in the design it-
self.24 It seems, then, that two intrinsically indistinguishable processes 
may have different structuring causes. Consequently, we should aban-
don intrinsicness as a necessary condition for causal efficacy. 
Dretske's argument has a limited scope, though. It certainly demon-
strates that extrinsic (qua extrinsic) properties can legitimately partici-
pate in causal explanations, but only in structuring explanations. In 
other words, extrinsic (qua extrinsic) properties can be structuring 
causes but not triggering causes. Extrinsic properties could only count 
as triggering causes insofar as, relative to a given context, they locally 
supervene upon physical intrinsic properties. 25 But, in this case, extrin-
sic properties would not be, as Drestke points out, explanatorily rele-
vant, since they would not be causally efficacious qua extrinsic proper-
ties. We can, then, conclude that the instrinsicness condition does not 
apply to structuring explanations, but only to triggering causes. Let's 
refer to this limited condition as the intrinsicness* condition. We can, 
then, say that Dretske is committed to intrinsic* materialism, that is, a 
version of materialism which assumes strong materialism together with 
the intrinsicness* condition. 
This conclusion is directedly relevant to the causal efficacy of men-
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tal contents. For, as Dretske stresses, mental contents are extrinsic 
properties of an organism whereby mental contents (qua·mental con-
tents) can only be structuring causes, but not triggering causes, of be-
haviour. Dretske feels entirely satisfied with this conclusion, since he 
claims that it captures our essential intuitions about the Éñélúaíoêó=
relevance of mental content.26 We27 are not completely happy with this 
restriction and consider that commonsense intuitions point to viewing 
mental contents· as triggering causes as well. Roughly speaking, it 
seems intuitive to claim that the content of my beliefs and desires fre-
quently act as triggering causes of my outputs. Typically, I reach the 
fridge because I think there is a beer and I want to have a beer. It 
. 
seems that, in such cases, my belief and desire, having_ the content they 
have, cause my bodily movements. The problem is that these intuitions 
do not square with Dretske's intrinsic* materialism. What we purport 
to do next is precisely to vindicate mental contents (qua mental con-
tents) as triggering causes by developing an argument which will chal-
lenge not only Dretske's intrinsic* materialism, but ultimately strong 
materialism too. 
Ill EXTRINSIC (QUA EXTRINSIC) PROPERTIES AS 
TRIGGERING CAUSES 
Ill (i) The Principle of Property Causation 
We have been speaking so far about the causal efficacy of intrinsic 
and extrinsic, physical and mental, properties without working out 
what is the sort of thing that causal relations are supposed to connect. 
We have súÉnI=though, that the current issue about the explanatory rel-
evance of content is not merely the causal efficacy of mental content, 
but the causal efficacy of mental content qua mental content. It seems 
obvious, however, 'that this question can only be raised if we assume 
that it makes sense to speak of causal relations between events in virtue 
of having certain· properties. For what we are discussing is whether an 
event C, with a content property R, brings about an event E with a 
property B in virtue of having content property R. Within a David-
sonian approach, where causal relations only hold between events, we 
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can certainly say that mental events are causes but not in virtue of be-
ing mental. Hence, the issue about the causal efficacy of mental con-
íÉnú=qua mental content necessarily assumes what we might call the 
principle of property causation, that is, that there are causal relations be· 
tween events in virtue of having· certain properties. In this conúÉñíI=we 
wish to oppose facts to events, a fact being an event E having a certain 
property P. This is, though, a pure terminological option.. All that we 
say about facts can trivially be described as concerning events in virtue 
of having certain properties. Hence, those readers that would prefer to 
say that causal connections hold between events should adequately de-
code our references to facts. Accordingly, we can now say that what 
íúÉ=principle of property causation contends is that there are causal re-
lations among facts. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic facts can be distinguished insofar as they are 
repectively concerned with intrinsic or extrinsic properties of events28. 
The principle of property causation by itself imposes no constraint 
upon the sorts of facts (i.e., extrinsic or intrinsic) that can be causally 
related. Yet, the intrinsicness* condition and the strong supervenient 
constraint are meant to complement this principle by imposing some 
constraints. It seems obvious, however, that the intrinsicness* condi-
tion can be supported by the strong supervenience constraint. It fol-
lows from the strong supervenient constraint that the triggering proper-
ties of a system must strongly supervene on the physical properties of 
the system relative to a given physical context. Consequently, extrinsic 
properties could only count as triggering causes insofar as, relative to a 
certain physical context, they locally supervene upon the physical 
properties of the system. But, in such a case, extrinsic properties would 
not count as triggering causes qua extrinsic properties. Hence, strictly 
spealdng, only the intrinsi_c properties of a system can count as trigger-
ing causes, and this is what the intrinsicness* condition urges . 
. We are, however, reluctant to concede the strong supervenience con-
straint. Thus, in the section III (ii), we shall produce an argument to 
call into doubt this last constraint and, in section Ill (iii) , derive the 
consequences of our challenge for the instrinsicness* condition and 
Dretske's naturalization program. 
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Ill (ii) . The Strong Supervenience Constraint Metaphysically 
U nmotivated 
Not all facts can enter causal explanations. According to Dretske, 
the liberality of the principle of property caúsaíáon=is conditioned by 
the strong supervenience constraint. All sorts of explanans and ex-
plananda are permitted insofar as they are strongly supervenient upon 
physical explanans and ÉñélúnandaK=Thus, even structuring causes pro-
vide causal explanantions only if they strongly supervene upon physi-
cal facts and their corresponding triggering connections. To give an ex-
ample, evolutionary explanations are structuring explanations. We can 
imagine different evolutionary explanations .of the same type of fact, 
but each of these evolutionary explanations will only count as a causal 
explanation if there is an implementing mechanism, a set of triggering 
causes, that constitutes the physical supervenient base upon which evo-
lutionary properties strongly supervene. 
·Our question is, however: Why should we accept the strong superve-
nience constraint upon the principle of property causation? We cannot 
examine in detail all the arguments that have been provided in the re-
cent literature29 to answer this question. we shall concentrate, though, 
on what may constitute the fundamental intuitions· behind the endorse-
ment of the strong supervenience constraint. The argument for this 
strong constraint goes as follows. 
The principle of property causation without the limit imposed by the 
strong supervenience constraint infringes the principle of physical clo-
sure of the world and leads to dualism. For, if we gave up the strong -su-
pervenience constraint, we would be bound to concede the existence 
of nonphysical phenomena that have no éhósácú=explanation, that is, 
that have not been physically caused. This consequence clearly breaks 
the principle of physical closure and is an essential part of what dual-
ists contend. Hence, if we are actually reluctant to admit dualism and 
challenge the principle of physical closure, we are forced to limit the 
liberality of the principle of property. causation by the strong superve-
nience constraint. 
This aFgument is flawed, though. Firstly, once we acknowledge (fol-
lowing the principle of property causation) that there are causal rela-
tions between facts, we are bound to redefine our conception of the 
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closure of the physical world. The claim that all events are physical, 
and therefore have a complete physical explanation, becomes irrele-
vant. For we are concerned with not the causal connections between 
events as such, but between events in virtue of having certain proper-
ties. And these properties can certainly be physical, but also biological, 
geological, mental, and the like. Furthermore, the stronger contention 
that all facts are physical facts, that is, that all causal connections be-
tween events hold in virtue of having the physical properties they have, 
clearly goes beyond the reach of the principle of physical closure. In 
fact, it seems that the most that this principle could commit us to say-
ing is that all physical properties of the world constitute a closed sys-
tem, that is, that there is no physical property of an event which can-
not be physically explained. But the principle of property causation is 
entirely compatible with such a principle even if the strong superve-
nience constra.int is dropped out. For, on this interpretation, the princi-
ple of physical closure exclusively affects physical facts and its validity 
is independent of allowing for biological or mental facts not having a 
physical explanation. 
Somebody might object, however, that, even if not all facts are physi-
cal facts, the principle of physical closure not only affects physical 
facts, but should also include the claim that all facts (physical and non-
physical) must have a physical explanation. Let us refer to this new in-
terpretation of the principle of physical closure as the the principle of 
physical explanation. We shall seek to show, úoughI=that the introduc-
tion of this last principle either begs the question or falls short of what 
is required to support the intrinsicness condition. 
To begin with, we should distinguish between a strong and a weak 
understanding of the principle of physical explanation. Specifically, the 
weak interpretation is associated with the global supervenience con-
straint. It trivially follows from this constraint that, for any fact of the 
form 'xis in the psychological state P,' there must be a physical super-
venient base, that is, a set of physical truths about the world from 
which the truth of the statement that describes the psychological fact 
follows. What the weak principle of physical causation comes to saying 
is that a Laplacean demon, adequately endowed with the abilitiy to 
produce psychological attributions, would be able. to derive the truth of 
a psychological statement from his knowledge of the relevant set of 
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physical facts. It is crucial to stress, however, that, in allowing for the 
possibility of such a Laplacean demon, we are not assuming the exis-
tence of a systematic connection between the physical supervenient 
bases of mental facts that, by contrast, are systematically interlocked 
·from an áníúníáonal= perspective. We are not claiming that our 
Laplacean demon could, for instance, derive the physical superve-
nience base of 'John wants to drink a beer' from a suitable combina-
tion of the physical supervenient bases of properties like 'being John,' 
'wanting,' 'drinking,' and Dbúáng=a beer. ' Similarly, the weak principle of 
physical causation does not entail the existence of a systematic connec-
tion among the physical supervenient bases of psychological facts like 
'John wants to drink a beer,' 'Peter wants to drink a cup of tea,' 'Peter 
believes that there is a beer,' etc., which, obviously, any intentional psy-
chology should interrelate. The vindication of such a systematic con-
nection is specific, by contrast, to the strong reading of the principle of 
physical explanation. Correspondingly, only the adoption of this strong 
principle could guarantee the existence of a systematic connection be-
tween physical and nonphysical explanations. 
Going back to the argument for the intrinsicness* condition, we can 
easily see that the intrinsicness* condition can be substantiated by the · 
strong principle of physical explanation. For it seems clear that only 
those properties of a system that ·are strongly supervenient on the phys-
ical properties of the system (even if relative to a context) can meet 
such a strong principle. Yet, in the context of our discussion, the 
strong principle of physical explanation cannot be used to ground ei-
ther the intrinsicness* condition or the strong supervenient constraint 
without begging the question. For this strong principle is not stronger, 
but equivalent to the strong supervenience constraint we were sup-
posed to substantiate. 
At this point, it is crucial to notice that what we have called the 
strong supervenience constraint admits of a soft and a hard reading. 
On its soft reading, Kim is right when he claims that global superve-
nience entails strong supervenience30. If two physically ádúníácal=
worlds share all their mental properties. we can hardly deny that there 
must be, for each particular instantiation of any given mental property, 
a· sub-set of physical properties of these worlds that constitutes its su-
pervenient base in both worlds. Needless to say, we have no problem 
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in accepting that a sub-set of the physical properties of a particular 
world defines the supervenient base of my present desire to drink wa-
ter. But if this · is all what follows from the soft understanding of the 
strong supervenience constraint, this cannot be the reading which lies 
behind the issue about mental causation, since mental contents would 
trivially satisfy such a modest constraint. Hence, it seems that the 
strong supervenience constraint deserves a more demanding interpre-
tation, if it has to put a problematic constraint upon the causal efficacy 
of mental properties. We can, then, say the strong principle of physical 
explanation simply renders explicit the sort of requirement that, in the 
issue about mental causation, the strong supervenience constraint was 
meant to impose. Finally, we should say the weak principle of physical 
explana.tion falls obviously short of what is required to back up the in-
trinsicness* condition. Since, once the systematicity condition is aban-
doned, the strong supervenience constraint, which the intrinsicness* 
condition presupposes, stops being a necessary condition for causal ef-
ficacy. 
Some people, though, may fmd this weak principle of physical expla-
nation insufficient, that it does not square with our fundamental intu-
itions. For these people may conceive of causal chains between facts 
that are not nomically, systematically, dependent upon physical proper-
ties as utterly weird. The causal efficacy of such causal chains appear-
ing as something mysterious. What is, however, the source of such un-
easiness?. It seems clear that it cannot be strictly epistemic. Nobody 
doubts that we have the epistemic ability to detect what appear to be 
causal chains between facts, regardless of our epistemic ability to de-
tect the supervenient base of them. Explanations and predictions in 
commonsense psychology manifestly rest upon such an ability. What is 
called into question, however, is whether we are dealing, in folk psy-
chology, with actual causal chains and not úÉêÉló=chains that appear to 
be causaL Nevertheless, this is no longer an epistemic issue, but a 
metaphysical one. What we really want to decide is whether a certain 
apparent causal chain has a strong physical supervenient base, so that 
it could be recognized as an actual causal chain. Hence, the source of 
the uneasiness some people may feer is that, unless causal chains be-
tween nonphysical facts are strongly supervenient upon a· physical 
base, we will not be able to say that they are actually efficacious. In 
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other words, what these people urge is that the strong supervenience 
constraint needs to be introduced in order to account for the distinc-
tion between real causal chains and mere regularities. This argument, 
though, has the structure of an inference to the best explanation, and 
what we propose is precisely an alternative story. 
Why not consider the weak principle of physical explanation as the 
only metaphysical necessary condition, which, together with some ad-
ditional epistemic requirements, will allow us to tell real from merely 
apparent causal chains? At frrst sight, some people may still feel dissat-
isfied and be inclined to say that this weak principle is insufficient, that 
some stronger metaphysical condition is required. Yet, our venture is 
that, at this point, these people may be begging the question: Can they 
show that our story is insufficient without previously assuming the 
strong principle of physical explanation and, therefore, the strong su-
pervenience constraint? Unless they could do this, they would be beg-
ging the question. Of course, we have not shown that such an indepen-
dent motivation could not be provided. Our argument in this paper has 
been notoriously more modest. We have confmed ourselves to rebut-
ting a classical argument for such a constraint, namely, the argument 
based on the rejection of dualism and the endorsement of the principle 
of physical closure. For our account acknowledges the closure of the 
physical facts of the world and avoids dualism by accepting that, for 
any particular causal chain, there must be a physical supervenient 
base. The supervenient base that would allow our Laplacean demon to 
impute contentful descriptions out of the perception of its physical 
base; but, as we have seen, this not enough to sustain the strong super-
venience constraint. 
We can, then, conclude that the rejection of dualism and the vindica-
tion of the principle of physical closure cannot be used to narrow 
down the scope of the principle of property causation by the strong su-
pervenience constraint. Since dualism can be avoided and physical clo-
sure respected without this constraint being imposed. Furthermore, we 
are inclined to think (and intend to prove in a later paper) that the 
strong supervenience constraint is not required to account for any of 
our fundamental metaphysical intuitions, so that, unless we adopt it as 
primitive, we are bound to abandon it as metaphysically superfluous. 
From the abandonment of the strong supervenience constraint impor-
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tant consequences follow for the intrinsicness condition and Dretske's 
naturalization program. 
Ill (ill) Once the Strong Supervenience Constraint is Abandoned 
If the strong suéÉêvÉnúnáÉncÉ=constraint fails, the intrinsicness* con-
dition becomes metaphysically unmotivated and Dretske' s naturaliza-
tion program comes out metaphysically superfluous. But let us go step 
by step. 
As we have seen, Dretske views the intrinsicness condition as a nec-
essary requiremeJ!t for a fact to count as a triggering cause. Yet, in sec-
tion Ill (i), we showed that the intrinsicness* condition rests upon the 
strong supervenience constraint. Hence, if this last constraint loses 
its foot, so does the intrinsicness* condition. The intrinsicness* condi-
tion was, however, the only metaphysical obstacle to be removed, in 
Dretske's approach, before recognizing extrinsic (qua extrinsic) proper-
ties as triggering causes. It trivially follows from this conclusion that 
the ex:trinsicness of mental contents does not prevent them from acting 
as triggering causes. 
. Correspondingly, Fregean thoughts will be able to operate as trigger-
ing causes, even if th<? reference of propositional attitudes are extrinsic 
properties of an organism. In other words, although the first part of 
Putnam's argument is correct: the reference of the prepositional con-
tent of mental states is a relational or extrinsic property of an organ-
ism. The conclusion that Fodor and Dretske have drawn does not fol- · 
low: Fregean íhoughíú=cannot be triggering causes of our outputs and, 
therefore, cannot form a part of a scientific psychology which seeks to 
provide triggering explanations. We have argued, by contrast, that ex-
trinsic properties of an organism can count as triggering causes of its 
outputs, so that a relevant part of Frege's intuitions about the identity 
of mental contents and their caus_al efficacy can be preserved. 
Let us turn now to Dretske's program to naturalize mental content. 
Dretske's program becomes metaphysically irrelevant, once the strong 
supervenience constraint is abandoned. For Dretske's program is sim-
ply an attempt to show that mental contents meet the strong superve-
nience constraint as a necessary step to acknowledge the causal effica-
cy of mental content qua mental content. Metaphysical irrelevance 
164 }OSEP E. CORBf and }OSEP L. PRADES 
does not amount to epistemic irrelevance. In fact, Dretske's naturaliz-
ing attempt might be construed as promoting a fairly valuable epis-
temic goal, namely, increasing the degree of cohesion among the prop-
erties that the different kinds of theories that compose the scientific 
landscape deal with. In any event, our intuition is that, despite this 
epistemic reinterpretation, Dretske's naturalizing attempt fails, that is, 
does not manage to indicate how mental contents meet the strong su-
pervenience constaint. In our opinion, Dretske's program is subject to 
the traditional objections to logical behaviourism. For Dretske's ac-
. count relies on the behaviourist notion of discriminatory learning, and 
it has been soundly argued that the response to the question 'What.is 
learned?' cannot be derived from the answer to the naturalistic ques-
tion 'What is rewarded?,' if vicious circularity is to be avoided31. But, 
of course, we have no room to discuss this point here. 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is an attempt to pursue Dretske's challenge to the intrin-
sicness condition. Dretske -argues that extrinsic (qua extrinsic) proper-
ties can be structuring causes of a process, whereby they can partici-
pate in structuring explanations.He considers, though, . that triggering 
causes must respect the intrinsicness condition, so that extrinsic (qua 
extrinsic) properties cannot enter triggering explanations. We have 
sought to go beyond Drestke's .stance and defend the view that there is 
no metaphysical motivation to maintain the intrinsicness condition 
even for triggering causes (i.e., the intrinsicness* condition). 
We have stressed that strong materialism entails the principle of 
property causation. For strong materialism presupposes the strong su-
pervenience constraint, and this constraint can only be stated if one as-
sumes that events can be causally efficacious in virtue of having certain 
properties, and this is what the principle of property causation urges. 
Once we accept the principle of property causation, the intrinsic-
ness* condition stops being trivially true and needs to be grounded 
upon the strong supervenience constraint. We have sought to show, 
though, that the adoption of the strong supervenience constraint is 
metaphysically unmotivated. For the principle of property causation al-
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lows us to dispense with the strong supervenience constraint in the ma-
terialist attempt to escape dualism and vindicate the principle of physi-
cal closure. Hence, unless we are prepared to impose arbitrary meta-
physical conditions or some further motivation is provided, we are 
bound to abandon the intrinsicness* condition. Consequently, mental 
contents qua mental contents can no longer be ruled out as triggering 
causes by the mere fact that they are extrinsic properties32 and, there-
fore, the fact that Fregean thoughts include, as Putnam pointed out, ex-
trinsic properties does not prevent them from entering triggering expla-
nations.33. 
NOTES 
(1) Cf. [Frege, 1966, p. 346, 360-2]. 
(2) For the sake of brevity, we will save the clause 'qua mental con-
tent in referring to the causal efficacy of mental content qua mental 
content, except where relevant to avoid misunderstandings. 
(3) [Dretske, 1988, p. x] 
( 4) [Dretske, 1988, p. 79-80]. 
(5) This is, of course, a central issue in cognitive science. In the re-
cent literature, J. Fodor [Fodor, 1987, p. 135; 1985, p. 78] maintains 
the strongest realist stance with respect to mental contents and their 
causal efficacy, although R.G. Millikan [Millikan, 1984, p. 8} and 
Dretske [Dretske, 1981, 1987] are also committed to intentional real-
ism. By contrast, we fmd in Dennett [Dennett, 1981, 1987c, 1987d] a 
more instrumentalist position, whereas P.M. and P.S. Churchland 
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[Churchland 1989, 1986] vindicates eliminative materialism. For a 
map of the most relevant stances with regard to this issue: Fodor 
[Fodor, 1985]. Dennett [Dennett, 1969, chapter 2, 1987a, 1987b, 
1991] and also Lyons [Lyons, 1990a, 1990bf 
(6) Cf. [Dretske, 1981, p. xi]. and [Dretske, 1988, p. 80]. 
(7) Cf., for instance, [Kirn, 1984, pp. 163-7]. 
(8) We can certainly distinguish between strong and weak superve-
nience. While strong supervenience is concerned with instantiation 
conditions that are valid across all possible worlds, weak superve-
nience only vindicates its validity relative to a given set of possible 
worlds. In any event, this distinction will not be explored, since it is 
not necessary to our purposes. 
(9) As in Kim [Kim, 1984, p. 165-6), no commitment to a particu-
lar notion of possibility or necessity is required to introduce the dis-
tinction. 
( 10) Physical properties are the properties posited by the theories of 
physics, while nonphysical properties are the rest of the properties of 
the world. 
( 11) More sophisticated arguments in favour of a limited version of 
the intrinsicness condition will be deployed in que course. qús=remark 
is onúó=meant to provide an initial and very rough motivation for the 
condition in question. 
( 12) Dretske defmes 'extrinsic property' as follows: "The basic idea of 
an extrinsic property is that of a property a thing possesses, not because 
of the way it is, búí=because of the way other things, things to which it 
stands in certain relations, are (or were)" [Dretske, 1992, p. 3]. 
(13) For the classical case against the notion of narrow content, cf. 
Putnam [Putnam, 1975] and Burge [Burge, 1979]. A classical defence 
of this notion can be found in Fodor [Fodor, 197 5 J, Fodor [Fodor, 
1980] and Field [Field, 1978]. For interesting discussion of this issue 
cf. Woodfield [Woodfield, 1982] and Pettit and McDowell [Pettit 
and McDowell, 1986]. A more recent criticism of narrow content in 
Putnam [Putnam, 1988, chapters 1-3] and a revision ofthe concept in 
Fodor [Fodor, 1987, eh. 2], and Fodor [Fodor, 1991]. 
( 14) Of course, these brief indications do not aim to elucidate Frege's 
notion of thought, but to mention a few aspects of what in the debate 
at stake have been described as Fregean thoughts. 
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( 15) Cf. Fodor [Fodor, 1987, p. 46- 53], where he comes to vindicate 
the existence of narrow contents even if they are essentially inexpress-
ible. 
( 16) [Dretske, 1992, p. 6] 
(17) [Dretske, 1990, p. 783 ]. 
( 18) It may be advisable, at this juncture, to introduce a couple of 
qualifications,. Firstly, not all behaviours include some sort of move-
ment, even if they typically do [Dretske, 1987, p. 28]. Secondly, we 
must admit that there are processes that, like breathing and growing up, 
fit into Dretske's defmition and yet we wouldn't be initially inclined to 
recognized them as behaviour. Nevertheless, Dretske is not worried by 
these apparent counterexamples because choosing to describe a process 
as behaviour is, in the end, interest-relative [Dretske, 1990] p. 784 ]. 
(19) Cf. [Dretske, 1987, p. 32]. 
(20) Cf. [Dretske, 1987, p. 18 and 36]. This distinction between 
process and output allows Dretske, as we shall see, to discriminate be-
tween the subject-matter of psychology and that of neuroscience (Cf. 
[Dretske, 1987, pp. 51-2]). 
(21) [Dretske, forthcoming, sec. 1 par. 1]. 
(22) Cf. [Dretske, 1987, p. 42-3], and [Dretske, forthcoming, sec. 1, 
par. 4] . . 
(23) Cf. [Dretske, 1987, p. 42-J ], and [Dretske, fortJ:coming], sec. 1, 
par. 4 ]. 
(24) Cf. [Dretske, 1992, p. 8]. Similar·arguments can be developed 
with biological examples where the same type of phenomenon may be 
due to two distinct evolutionary stories and, therefore, to two distinct 
structuring causes. 
(25) Cf. [Fodor, 1987, 46-53], and [K.im, 1991, p. 67]. 
(26) [Dretske, 1991, p. 198]. 
(27) Cf. [Horgan, 1991, pp. 85-6]. 
(28) The principle of property causation enables us to discriminate 
between physiological and psychological explanatiGns. Although both 
kinds of explanations deal with the same events, the principle in ques-
tion allows us to say that they are concerned with distinct classes of 
facts. Dretske himself subscribes to this thesis and discriminates be-
tween outputs as the explananda of physiology and behaviours as the 
explananda of psych_ology. 
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(29) Cf. Kim [ 1984, 1990, 1989, 1991]. 
(30) Cf. [Kim, 1984, pp. 168-9]. 
( 31) For classical objections to behaviourism, cf. [ Chisholm, 1957 
chapter 2]; and .[Taylor, 1964, part II]. 
( 32) Of course, further objections can be raised against the causal ef-
ficacy of mental contents but we have no room to handle them in this 
paper. 
(33) We would like to thank . Juan J. Acero, Fred Dretske, Manuel 
Garcia-Carpintero, Tobies Grimaltos, Carlos J. Moya, David Owens, 
Lino San Juan, Barry Smith and Sergio Veliz for helpful remarks and 
discussion on an earlier version of this paper. Research for this paper 
has been funded by the Spanish Government's DGICYT as part of the 
projects PS-93-0178 and PB93-1049-C03-02. Our thanks to this institu-
tion for its generous help and encouragement. 
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